



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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2 April 1980*

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
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SITUATION REPORT

① IRAN

3 President Bani-Sadr's comments last night indicating that the US has not met Iran's conditions for transferring the hostages to government control probably reflects his weak political position.

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3 Bani-Sadr almost certainly has faced serious opposition to his proposal and he may well continue to ask for more concessions to avoid appearing too conciliatory toward the US. Even if he has good intentions, Bani-Sadr lacks the political influence to carry out his pledge to transfer control of the hostages unless Ayatollah Khomeini directly orders the militants to comply.

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3 In a hardline statement yesterday Khomeini pointedly ignored the transfer issue, indicating he is unlikely to reverse his public support of the militants. The Ayatollah apparently believes that the Shah, abetted by US plotting, continues to threaten his Islamic Republic.

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3 The President's assertion that the Revolutionary Council favors transferring the hostages is also open to question. He and Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh have in the past consistently overstated their support from the Council and Khomeini.

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3 The militants continue to receive support from powerful political allies including the left and the cleric-dominated Islamic Republic Party. A spokesman for the militants indicated yesterday that they will only obey instructions from Khomeini. A Foreign Ministry spokesman admitted, moreover, that no action against the militants is possible without Khomeini's approval.

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The Kurdish Problem

3 Both Khomeini and Bani-Sadr took a tough line on Kurdish opposition to the government in their statements yesterday. Khomeini suggested no one's interests would

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1 be served unless the Islamic Republic survived, and called upon Kurdish "brothers and sisters" to desist from their separatist ways and recognize the authority of the central government. (U)

1 Citing national security as a primary concern, Bani-Sadr called on the Kurdish Democratic Party to lay down its arms. He confirmed recent reports of Army activity against armed Kurdish groups, and threatened that military operations would continue as long as internal security is endangered. (U)

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2 Khomeini's position--that the Kurds are misguided and subject to manipulation by external powers--is not new, but Bani-Sadr's rejection of further compromise signals a significant hardening of the government's attitude that is likely to heighten tension with the Kurds. ☐

#### Oil Production

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2 Preliminary data from the National Iranian Oil Company indicates that during the 30-day period ending 20 March Iranian oil production averaged 2.3 million barrels per day. Production apparently has rebounded from a mid-month drop caused by a series of sabotage incidents. Exports averaged 1.4 million barrels per day, down 300,000 barrels per day from the previous month. ☐

#### Relations With Iraq

3 Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz was slightly wounded yesterday by an "Iranian" terrorist, according to the official Iraqi news service. The announcement did not claim that the terrorist, who was killed by Iraqi security forces, was acting on the orders of the Iranian Government. Nevertheless, the incident will strengthen Baghdad's determination to undermine the regime in Tehran. The Iraqis already provide aid to a wide variety of Khomeini's domestic opponents. ☐

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